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Structuring the European Adminstrative Space 
Channels of EU Penetration and Mechanisms of 
National Change
Eva G. Heidbreder
Freie Universität Berlin
Abstract
The author provides an analytical model to capture mechanisms of supranational impact on national 
public administrations. The aim is to understand how we can perceive a European administrative space 
given the persistent diversity between member states. In face of the overly complex subject matter, it is 
argued that a typology that presents ideal types of interaction modes between supranational and national 
levels of administration provides in fact a suitable pragmatic approach to understand the potential impact 
of European integration on national civil services. Scrutinizing which mechanisms of possible influence-
taking the European Union (EU) invokes shows that administrative integration does actually not suggest 
overall convergence. Instead the shared administrative space works precisely because it preserves state-
sensitive diversity. Only in the context of enlargement did the EU need to present a single model to the 
candidate states and thus the notion of an ever more converging single administrative space was invented. 
Despite the external promotion of a single model, the driving dynamic of the emerging European 
administrative space remains increased cooperation and common administration that respects and 
sustains differences between independent national public administrations. The theoretical framework 
and empirical application therefore provide a first step for further research to tackle how supranational 
integration changes national public administration.
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1. Introduction: Is There a European Administrative Space?
 An emerging European administrative space (EAS) has been acclaimed in various guises. The existing body 
of research poses vital questions, not least of which is the definition of a European administrative space 
as increasing “convergence on a common European model” (Olsen 2003: 506). More skeptical towards ‘a 
common model’ and based on the review of a wide range of articles that scrutinize the effects of European 
integration on national administrations, Goetz calls for “caution in treating European integration as a 
major independent source of executive change. This is not to suggest that European integration does not 
matter; but it might matter in a rather less straightforward manner than the Europeanisation literature 
tends to assume” (Goetz 2001: 227). By the same token, the term of a single European administrative 
space misleadingly evokes the connotation of trends of overall convergence. Empirical evidence shows 
that national systems are indeed very robust in sustaining the differences between EU member states 
(Jordan 2007: 947), thus notions of Europeanized national administrations, networked administrative 
system or EU administrative community have been suggested as more apt to capture the phenomenon 
(Siedentopf/Speer 2003: 23). More substantially than matters of terminology, there is a need for more 
empirical exploration of the specific features of inter- and transnational linkages (Goetz 2006: 484f), as 
well as more coherent theoretical conceptualization in light of the inconsistent empirical evidence on the 
domestic impact of EU integration (Knill 2001: 12).
The puzzle, this paper attends to, is to get a conceptual grip on the apparently contradicting evidence: an 
emerging European administrative space without convergence between national public administrations. 
National systems are indeed affected by European integration, yet there is no genuine EU type of 
public administration to replace the dissolving national models. The key argument is that a systematic 
categorization of the mechanisms of potential EU penetration of the member states’ public administrations 
offers a pragmatic approach to understand the impact of EU integration on national public administration. 
The focus is hence on mechanisms, on what and how the EU could influence, while the analysis of eventual 
outcomes remains beyond the scope of this paper and will be merely touched upon in the empirical 
illustration. 
Two essential qualifications are necessary with respect to the focus of the paper, one regarding the 
explanandum and one the research strategy. First, the core interest is placed on the mechanisms of 
change of national public administrations instead of thinking processes from their eventual outcome. 
Precisely by ignoring whether convergence, stability or divergence will result allows a more impartial view 
on the dependent variable, namely the constitutive dimensions of national public administrations. The 
question is then: how can the EU potentially influence national public administrations? Unlike the bulk of 
current research, the question of convergence is explicitly disregarded. Not the increased approximation 
of national systems indicates the existence of a EU administrative space but strengthened mutually 
dependencies and integrated functioning of various bodies across the system – appealing coarsely to 
the motto of “unity in diversity.” As will be shown, an administrative space emerges not on the basis of 
universal convergence processes but, on the contrary, is fostered by various mechanisms that may equally 
preserve, maintain or even increase diversity. Consequently, legal analyses conclude that “the European 
administrative space is the area in which increasingly integrated administrations jointly exercise powers 
delegated to the EU in a system of shared sovereignty” (Hofmann 2008: 671). 
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The enlargement process ruptured this practice. Due to the special traits of the unstable, transforming 
public administrations in Central and Eastern Europe, the pre-existing mode of administrative integration 
has been challenged in the enlargement process. Since the demands of the candidate states clashed 
with the principles in practice, it is in this context that the notion of a single European administrative 
space was invented, first used and given the connotation of approximation toward a universal EU model. 
The EU approach to national public administrations as part of the enlargement strategy will therefore 
be referred to throughout the paper because it was in this context that the EU attempted for the first 
time to provide a positive definition of an alleged EAS. Furthermore, the way the specific instruments 
were applied highlights some of the features of the respective mechanisms because the actual strengths 
or weaknesses of supranational governance were reinforced when applied to the external candidate 
states. This notwithstanding, although enlargement has set off a vigorous academic debate on the EAS 
especially amongst legal scholars, this intervening episode has not fundamentally changed the processes 
and mechanisms through which EU integration adapts national public administrations.1 
Secondly, identifying relevant research desiderates, I agree with the above-cited diagnosis by Goetz (2001, 
2006); the EU might matter much less straightforwardly than is often assumed. At the same time, in more 
normative terms, this article agrees with Olsen who affirms that despite the incontestable lack of concepts, 
methodology and data for a methodologically faultless analysis “[a] more pragmatic view, and the one 
upon which this paper is based, is that the questions are too important to be ignored. The challenge is 
to develop analytical models with explanatory power that improve our comprehension of administrative 
dynamics” (2003: 507). However, I depart from the strategies proposed by either author. On the one 
hand, Goetz calls for an attempt to start from a design that aims to control for and isolate Europeanization 
effects from other relevant sources of change (Goetz 2001: 227f). On the other hand, Olsen upholds the 
convergence hypothesis against competing explanations (globalization, institutional robustness) to dissect 
the development of national administrations inside the EU (Olsen 2003). 
In line with what has been said concerning the explanandum, the pragmatic research strategy focuses 
instead on what the EU actually does. These practices are rendered analytically meaningful by placing 
them in a systematic grid that provides ideal types of patterns of administrative interaction, which are 
substantiated with empirical evidence of types of interaction between the supranational and national 
levels. Based on such an ideal typical classification of relevant EU actions, the underlying mechanisms 
can be theoretically deduced and their effect can be examined by limiting the focus on tracing their 
occurrence. Starting from ideal types of patterns of administrative interactions, the proposed approach 
differs in particular from the various approaches of Europeanization (Olsen 2001). Instead of expounding 
explanations from observable EU activities to describe actual phenomena and processes of change, I 
will start with a conceptual framework to first capture theoretically the range of potential supranational 
impact. This allows to cover a wider range of interactions, while for the purpose of this paper the focus 
is limited to the EU impact on national public administrations, paying almost no attention to bottom-up 
1 This paper takes into consideration the enlargement rounds that led to the accession of 12 new member states 
in 2004/2007. On administrative capacity-building in the context of ongoing enlargements see Elbasani (2009).
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processes from the national to the EU level as well as horizontal processes between member states. 2
The remainder of the paper abides by this research strategy. The second section outlines the theoretical 
framework in two steps. A typology of the channels of interaction between supranational and national 
levels is introduced and the underlying mechanisms of potential change are attributed to each interaction 
mode, respectively. Part three depicts the actual political strategies in each channel of EU–member state 
interaction. It provides an empirical analysis of the specific contents that each of the abstract mechanisms 
stands for. Therefore, at this point some actual empirical outcomes are touched upon, while the focus is 
on identifying the modes of interaction and not the actual outcomes they produce. The article concludes 
that the European administrative space is indeed emerging; yet not as a process of convergence but in 
great part as coordinated divergence. There is one central tenet guiding through this paper: to understand 
what the European administrative space is, we should not think about where it will lead to, but how it is 
driven. 
2. Theoretical Framework: Structuring the Dynamics of the EU’s Administrative  
 Space
How are the different loci of the entangled European administrative space linked? I will tackle this question 
in two steps. To structure the analysis, I introduce a typology of the modes in which the supranational level 
formally interacts with the level of domestic public administration. Each of the four types of channels of 
interaction implies different demands on the structure and functioning of national public administration. 
In a second step, the mechanisms underpinning each type of potential supranational influence are 
theoretically derived. Both, the channels of interaction and mechanisms of change, are conceptualized in 
abstract theoretical terms to capture how supranational organizations can affect structures and practices 
within public administrations within states.
2.1 Channels of Interaction between Supranational and National Public   
 Administration
Channels of interaction capture what types of supranational measures affect a national public administration 
2 Europeanization is a wider concept that captures both processes in which national administrations change in 
order to comply with EU legislation and processes in which member states feed into the formulation of supra-
national law and policies: Börzel (2002); Börzel (2003); Börzel/Risse (2000); Green Cowles et al. (2001); Héritier 
et al. (2001); Knill/Lehmkuhl (1999); Knill/Lehmkuhl (2002). It is, however, noteworthy that also a bottom-up 
perspective would differ systematically for all four cells – even if not elaborated here. In a wide definition, one 
could subsume all four cells of Table 2 under the concept of Europeanization. Conzelmann (1998), for instance, 
subsumes mechanisms beyond top-down coercion (change of preferences, mobilisation of new coalitions and 
alternative policy ideas) under the Europeanization concept. Also related issues of failed Europeanization due 
to non-compliance are not analysed here (for this, see Börzel 2001; Falkner et al. 2005; Héritier et al. 2001). 
In turn, Europeanization scholars have best distilled the relevance of national factors for EU-induced change. 
Some of the most prominent studies on Europeanization and the effects on national administrations triggered 
by the EU membership obligation focus on sectoral policy compliance (Börzel 2002; Börzel 2003; Börzel/Risse 
2000; Dimitrova 2005; Falkner et al. 2005; Green Cowles et al. 2001; Knill 2001; Knill/Lehmkuhl 2002; Knill/Len-
schow 2001; Lenschow et al. 2005)
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in which way. A channel of interaction is defined by the legal effect of supranational decision-making 
(binding, non-binding), and the degree of specificity of the requested national adaptation (generic change, 
functional offshoot). Starting with the latter, this dimension distinguishes how supranational measures 
can impact national public administrations, namely (a) by setting standards, that is intersubjectively 
shared rules or norms of administrative functions, structures and organization, practices and behavior; or 
(b) by defining policy goals whose implementation through national administrations entails adaptations 
of national administrations in order to comply with specific policy objectives. While standards regard 
public administrations ‘horizontally’ – that is administrative organization and functioning irrespective of 
the policy content – the policy-induced impacts emerge as side effects from compliance obligations to 
achieve a particular policy outcome. Accordingly, when standards apply, change in public administrations 
is an end in itself. When policies have to be implemented nationally, changes in the public administration 
are the means to achieve specific policy results.
The second dimension concerns the liability and obligations, in other words the degree of discretion 
of national actors in the application of supranational agreements. Applicability can be (a) direct if the 
relationship between the supranational and national bodies is hierarchically ordered and the supranational 
authority is equipped with sanctioning tools to enforce compliance on the lower levels. In contrast, (b) non-
hierarchical relationships do not grant either side sanctioning powers. Applicability is therefore indirect 
because modes of interaction like networks, negotiation or competition (Benz 2006) do not establish a 
direct prescriptive relationship between the supranational and national actors. In consequence, indirect 
applicability does not necessarily imply the promotion of a single preferred standard or implementation 
instrument but offers discretion to formulate and choose from a range of options.
Table 1 depicts the four types of legal instruments that ensue from the two dimensions. Note that this 
typology summarizes ideal types of how a supranational organization can influence the state level. To 
which extent and in which way the EU works through and diverges from these channels will be discussed 
subsequently and is, for the moment, left aside. In turn, these abstract categories adhere theoretically to 
all kinds of supranational organizations that influence state or sub-state units, be it the EU and its member 
states or any international organization and its participating parties. What kind of instrument does each 
channel of supranational – state interaction presuppose?
Table 1: Channels of supranational / state interaction
Supranational 
Influence
Applicability to 
Public Administration
Standards
Generic change
Policy Goals
Change as functional offshoot
Direct
Hierarchical relationship between 
EU / MS
PRINCIPLES
generally binding / horizontal
PRESCRIPTIONS
sector-specific binding / functional
Indirect
Non-hierarchical relationship 
between EU / MS
TARGETS
voluntary /selective
RESPONSES
results-based / instrumental
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Directly applicable standards establish principles and are in scope and content the most comprehensive 
channel of interaction. They are supranational rules of general reach on national public administrations and 
can be enforced hierarchically. Due to their formally binding character, the legitimacy of these standards 
relies on formalized legal procedures and democratic representation. Examples are general principles, such 
as the rule of law, that are universally valid for all public administrations and horizontally across all sectors 
and services. Indirectly applicable standards, in contrast, set out targets that are not formally binding. 
Hence, it is a matter of internal state decisions whether and which kind of administrative standard will 
be subject to voluntary coordination and how it will be considered within the national system. Indirectly 
applicable standards are not codified through legislative procedures but are formulated most prominently 
in informal communication networks. Communication networks can fulfill legitimizing functions to the 
extent to which they produce standards that are voluntarily taken up in independent national decision-
making processes because they are judged a superior solution to political problems. As will be illustrated 
in the empirical discussion, an important factor for the effect of supranational standards is, however, 
how abstractly they are formulated. For example, the legally binding standard ‘rule of law’ has become a 
founding principle of international organizations – yet, due to the great extension of the standard, all kinds 
of empirical occurrences may be evaluated as (non-) compliant. More concretely, standardized targets, 
such as those promoted by ‘new public management’ (NPM), provide more concise measures and intense 
benchmarks – but, given extensive discretion for national application, variance in eventual outcomes 
prevails here as well (Pollitt 2002; Radaelli 2005). In essence, supranational influence through standards 
promotes specific models that are either binding for the states involved, or states can voluntarily draw 
from policy options according to their state-internal preferences. 
Other than instruments that set supranational standards, policy-transmitted instruments build on the 
member states’ obligation to comply with shared supranational policy objectives. This does not mean that 
national public administrations are not under pressure for national administrative adaptations, quite to 
the contrary. The guiding logic is, however, that public administrations are merely means to achieve shared 
supranational policy goals. In this vein, directly applicable rules for policy implementation create sector 
specific prescriptions for national administrative structures and practices to deliver particular functional 
tasks. For instance, the creation of an ombudsman office is not a standard. It is a concrete attribution of 
a policy tool for the particular policy objective to achieve mediation of citizens’ concerns. If, on the other 
hand, a policy objective is formulated without specification of the policy instrument it is an indirectly 
applicable rule for national public administrations that has to comply with specific policy objectives. 
Yet, no specific supranational instrument imposes rules or prescriptions with respect to national public 
administrations, which however must develop adequate responses to deliver the compulsory policy goals. 
Staying within the example: whether citizens’ can voice their concerns via a minister’s internet blog or by 
seeing a priest does not matter, as long as the objective ‘mediation of citizens’ concerns’ is achieved. The 
insights, these general channels of interaction convey, highlight the logics through which supranational 
decisions are fed into national systems. To understand the processes at work, we need to unravel the 
causal mechanisms for each of these channels.
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2.2 Mechanisms of Supranational Impact on State-level Public Administrations
Which mechanisms of eventual change underlie each type of supranational penetration? In other 
words, which processes can we expect theoretically when supranational rules, targets, prescriptions or 
state responses are at play? As pointed out, the matter will not be tackled by asking whether change 
ultimately leads to convergence or not. The unit of analysis and dependent variable is the single national 
administration. The question dealt with, is which mechanisms of change affect the public administration of 
a state without assuming in parallel outcomes in terms of relational effects between states. The different 
logics by which the EU diffuses ideas (Börzel/Risse 2009) into national public administrations are best 
captured by the respective ‘ideas’ depicted by models of administration that are the political content 
in the above-outlined channels. Accordingly, each channel of interaction works by a logic that implies a 
particular role of national pubic administrations in relation to supranational rule along the two dimensions 
of potential influence.
Table 2: Mechanisms of change and role of state public administration
Table 2 summarizes the mechanisms for each channel of interaction, referring back the grid introduced in 
Table 1. Accordingly, where supranational principles (directly applicable/standards) are referred to, the EU 
actually promotes ideas on a single, broadly defined model, which places the national public administrations 
in the position of a subordinate of supranational authority. Likewise, directly applicable but sector-bound 
prescriptions (directly applicable/policy goals) obligate member states to adhere to specific administrative 
instructions. This is only possible in areas in which the EU has exclusive competences that attribute national 
public administrations the role of executing bodies under the lead of the European Commission. Where 
the EU has only indirect influence, it encourages certain models reflecting a plurality of models from 
which member states define particular targets (indirect/standards). National administrations are therefore 
independent brokers that are generally autonomous. Where the EU simply abstains from providing any 
definition of administrative ideas and national administrations are free to develop adequate responses 
(indirect/policy goals), national public administrations can be characterized as a kind of independent 
Supranational  
Influence 
 
Applicability to 
Public Administration 
Standards 
Generic change 
Policy Goals 
Change as functional offshoot 
Direct 
Hierarchical relationship between 
EU / MS 
Subordinate of 
Supranational Authority 
Promotion of a single general model 
 
Executing Body of 
EU Administration 
Mandatory adherence to a concrete model 
 
Indirect 
Non-hierarchical relationship 
between EU / MS 
Independent  
Broker 
Encouragement of a plurality of 
models 
 
Independent 
Implementation Agency 
Consent to a range of models  
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implementing agency: the supranational control instances consent to whatever member states choose as 
long as they achieve common policy results.
3. Illustrating the Emerging European Administrative Space
The conceptual framework is sufficiently abstract to apply to a wide range of cases that focus on this 
question: what are the mechanisms through which supranational interactions induce change inside state 
structures and alter behavior of national actors? I will operationalize the abstract concepts and identify 
empirically to which extent the above-outlined mechanisms are of relevance in the European Union. What 
are the actual policies tools the EU applies in each of the four channels of interaction?
First, I will discuss which standards the EU refers to. The creation and enforcement of directly applicable 
standards is the most explicit way of changing key dimensions of national administrations. While the EU has 
competences to harmonize certain policies, it lacks such authority with respect to public administrations. 
Short of EU competences on national administrations, not much political scientific attention has been 
paid to the matter until the mid-1990s. This changed in the context of enlargement. Designed especially 
for the Central and Eastern European states, the member states introduced a new accession criterion: the 
condition of sufficient national administrative capacities to comply with the shared acquis communautaire. 
Amongst EU researchers, this led primarily legal scholars to summarize and clarify the formal and informal 
principles of EU administrative law that had emerged over the years. Regarding practitioners in the EU, the 
Commission had to come up with measurable benchmarks of shared standards to define the targets the 
candidate states’ administrative capacities could be measured against. Second, we will turn to indirectly 
applicable standards. In addition and independent from the recourse to shared standards during the pre-
accession phase, informal cooperation between national public administrations emerged in the 1970s 
and was revived in the early 1990s. Beyond this, targeting and open coordination have been promoted as 
alternatives to binding cooperation under the Community method.
Second, I will turn to administrative change induced as a functional prerequisite for the effective 
achievement of supranationally defined policy goals. Initially, the principles guiding implementation of 
Community law built on discretion of the member state administrations. The Community hence relied 
predominantly on indirect administration. Even though certain types of administration have always been 
subject to exclusive direct administration by the Commission on behalf of the Community, these areas 
have gained relevance with the expansion of policy areas in the Single European Act starting in the late 
1980s (Chiti 2004: 40). As for general administrative principles, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
played an important role in the elaboration of administrative procedure principles by clarifying specific 
proceedings for the implementation of sectoral policies. “The cross-cutting nature of such principles 
derives from the fact that they are all inspired by the very same concern: the need to guarantee the 
effective implementation of Community law.” (Franchini 2004: 183) 
While the distinction between direct and indirect administration corresponds well with the typology of 
channels of EU–member state interaction, this division has blurred increasingly in practice. Introduced in 
Council Regulation 1334/2000, the notion of common administration applies to particular policy areas in 
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which the Commission shares administrative tasks with national administrations and agencies with various 
compositions and missions. These procedures do not rely on a clear hierarchy of authority but divide 
authority for different stages or aspects of the implementation of a policy. Therefore, procedures have 
emerged that do not easily fit into the analytical grid, as much as they cause problems of accountability 
and the attribution of political responsibility. Generally, however, 
“proposals privileging a division of tasks between the Community administration and national 
administrations abound. One suggestion is for the two entities to perform functionally different 
tasks in the policy chain, so that the Community administration makes decisions while the national 
authority execute them” (Franchini 2004: 193f). 
Accordingly, I will deal with common administration as element of directly applicable policy-induced 
supranational influence.3  
3.1 Supranational Principles and Subordinated National Public Administrations
The EU has no formal competences over national administrations; national public administrations 
have so far “remained strictly an area of national sovereignty, there cannot be any European policy 
since there is no community competence in this area” (Mangenot 2005: 4, italics in original). Ergo no 
comprehensive EU model of supranational standards exists and therefore hierarchical enforcement of a 
uniform EU administrative model is no major means of national administrative change: there is no single 
compulsory European Administrative Model. The EU has, nonetheless, incrementally established some 
fairly abstract standards that are backed by coercive supranational instruments that impose sanctions 
on member states that do not comply with EU administrative law principles. The formal basis for this 
can be found in the shared legal traditions of the member states that have been defined and refined by 
the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justices (Cardona 1999: 5). Directly applicable EU standards 
occur in two forms. For member states, they are limited to administrative law principles, which have been 
punctually substantiated by the ECJ. For the candidate states, in need to provide indicators to measure 
fulfillment of the accession criterion administrative capacity, these principles have subsequently been 
extended into tangible standards. These standards were not formalized within the EU acquis to amount 
to general EU benchmarks for harmonization but the notion of an emerging European administrative 
space was introduced to indicate a common framework and justify a supranational competence to impose 
and control these standards in the candidate states (Fournier 1998b: 125). Accordingly, the common EU 
framework was presented to the candidate states: 
“Shared principles of public administration among EU Member States constitute the conditions of 
a ‘European Administrative Space’ (EAS). The EAS includes a set of common standards for action 
3 The distinction remains an ideal type as empirical examples cut across these categories. An intermingling of the 
levels of administration however always occurs and also under strict direct administration, given the fact that 
the Commission always depends on the agency of national administrations – just as well as the latter are also 
always influenced by the Commission – even under ‘pure’ indirect administration. To clarify the potential chan-
nels of supranational organization on national administration, the analytical distinction is therefore of heuristic 
value; it allows for the identification of different factors that may cause change.
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within public administration which are defined by law and enforced in practice through procedures 
and accountability mechanisms. [...] Although the EAS does not constitute an agreed part of the 
acquis communautaire, it should nevertheless serve to guide the public administrative reforms in 
candidate countries.” (Cardona 1999: 5)
Not only was the very notion of an EAS constructed in the enlargement context, it is also here that we find 
a first systematic stocktaking of the underlying principles that had been harmonized by the jurisdiction of 
the ECJ. 
“If we attempt to systemise the main administrative law principles common to western European 
countries, we could distinguish the following groups: 1) reliability and predictability (legal certainty); 
2) openness and transparency; 3) accountability and 4) efficiency and effectiveness.” (Cardona 
1999: 8)4
These fundamental shared norms represent blank concepts. They are elusive concepts that contain 
broad principles that are to be refined case-by-case by public administrations that apply them or courts, 
which have to interpret them in cases of conflict. Consequently, due to their elusive character, national 
administrations have considerable scope in interpreting the principles. Therefore, application across the 
different member states varies widely. In cases of conflict, however, the ECJ has had coercive harmonizing 
effects by providing an interpretation of the principles in a given case. The only formal recognition of 
administrative principles in an EU founding document was the inclusion of the Right to Good Administration 
(Article 41) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms into the Lisbon Treaty. The effect this 
clause will have on the ECJ’s practice remains a matter of speculation for the time being. To illustrate how 
shared norms of public administrations currently work in the EU, I will briefly review the diverging national 
models of compliance with the established general principles and review some of the ECJ’s case-specific 
harmonizing interventions.
First, how do member states adhere to EU administrative law principles? Depending on the national 
administrative and legal traditions of the respective member state, domestic compliance differs 
substantially. To provide but a few examples: ‘neutrality of the civil service’ in Britain, France or Spain 
signifies succession of political parties in government and opposition while in consociational democracies 
like Austria, Belgium or the Netherlands, neutrality means the mutual supervision of political parties. ‘Rule 
of law’ in form of judicial control of administrative action in states such as France, Germany or Sweden 
is executed by specialized administrative courts, while in the British or Danish tradition ordinary courts 
sign responsible. These are only two examples that show how key principles are differently interpreted 
across states. Overall “important differences remain between the civil services of different EU Members 
– even the oldest ones as the Benelux countries, France, Germany and Italy – mainly due to the impact 
of differing national traditions and differences in the pace and priorities of ongoing civil service reform” 
4 Franchini (2004) provides the following list: “The Community legal system tends to distinguish between general 
principles, which are common to legal and administrative proceedings, and those principles that apply only to 
administrative proceedings. The common principles include: (1) legality; (2) impartiality; (3) subsidiarity; (4) 
proportionality; (5) the duty to motivate decisions; (6) legal certainty; (7) legitimate expectations; and (8) fun-
damental rights. Specific administrative principles are: (1) good administration; (2) the duty of sound financial 
management; (3) precision and completeness in presenting the relevant facts and interests; (4) the right of 
defence; and (5) the duty to state reasons and access to administrative documents.“
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(Ziller 1998: 144). Given that some of the equally relevant principles find themselves in inherent conflict 
with each other – for instance providing rule of law and procedural fairness at the same time as efficiency 
and effectiveness – abiding by all the principles necessitates above all an internally coherent and balanced 
national system. Thus, shared standards in form of blank concepts work precisely because they leave 
room for context-sensitive national interpretation.
Second, to which degree have blank concepts been filled with tangible meaning across EU member states? 
Regarding other mechanisms at work, especially sectoral legislative activity of EU institutions and the 
interaction among officials of the member states have had an impact. Still, the ECJ “plays, by and large, 
the major role in shaping common administrative law principles within the European Union” (Cardona 
1999: 17). While Community secondary legislation is predominantly sectoral, the Court’s case law points 
in sum to the development of more general administrative principles. Therefore, “the jurisprudence of the 
Court is the main source of general, i.e. non-sectoral, administrative law in the Union” (Cardona 1999: 17), 
even though the principles it refers to need to be derived from general administrative law principles as 
established by national administrative courts of the member states. Two rulings are of particular relevance 
to illustrate the impact of EC case law. The first concerns the organization of interlinked administration 
across the levels of governance. Introducing the claim for uniformity across the levels of the EU concerning 
access to juridical review for citizens, the Francovich case (ECJ 1991: C-6/90 and C-9/90) established the 
principle of direct state liability for compliance with EC law. This ruling marked a shift away from the 
principle of procedural autonomy, which the Court had invoked before.5  Setting the precedence for state 
liability marked a turning point. Since 
“Francovich, the Court has found that national governments may be held liable for laws, judicial 
decisions, and, [...], administrative measures that infringe European law. The court has developed a 
law of administration which applies not only to the Commission, but also to national bureaucracies.” 
(Bignami 2004: 5f)
Hence, Commission and national administration have a shared responsibility and in principle constitute 
an administrative unity whenever EC law is concerned. As will become evident in the discussion of directly 
applicable policy-induced EU impact, in the implementation of sectoral policies setting the principle 
of a single administrative law, according to which Commission and national bureaucracies are equally 
responsible and therefore competent, does not only blur the separation of competences but leads to an 
extension of shared administration.
The second case regards employment in national administrations and has been referred to as a case in which 
“the Court has intervened to define the very concept of ‘national public administration’” (Nizzo 2001: 3). In 
the late 1970s the problem of interpretation of the basic freedom of movement of workers first appeared. 
Until then, member states were free to define the scope of ‘employment in public administrations,’ which 
has a special status because it is exempt from the basic Community freedom of worker mobility. This 
5 Procedural autonomy granted member states the freedom to implement Community obligations according to 
their domestic public law and criminal and civil justice under the condition that two basic principles were met, 
namely the principle of equal treatment (same vindication of Community as national rights) and the principle 
of effectiveness (possibility for individuals to exercise Community rights in national courts) (ECJ 1976: 33/76, 
Rewe-Zentralfinanz EG v. Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland).
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scope for national interpretation allowed combating national unemployment by reserving specific posts in 
national administrations for nationals. In 1980 the ECJ (149/79 Commission v. Belgium) stated that 
“for the purpose of reserving a post to nationals, ‘employment in public administration’ had to be 
defined as employment ‘characteristic of the specific activities of public administration’ as implying 
the ‘exercise of powers of public law and safeguarding the general interests of the state’ or local 
authorities” (Ziller 1998: 140). 
This decision entailed a number of national reforms and most states opened up public posts and careers. 
Although no EU-wide provisions in terms of binding law have ensued, the general principle induced further 
unforeseen consequences. 
“The first consequence is the obligation to proceed to a classification of jobs and careers in order to 
determine whether they should be opened up or not. Then a series of steps have to be taken in order 
to ensure mutual recognition of qualifications and professional experience in public services, which 
can lead to a reappraisal of existing systems of training and mobility. Furthermore possibilities have 
to be created for international mobility of civil servants within the Union: this has an impact on the 
organisation of secondments, social security and pension schemes.” (Ziller 1998: 141)
These subsequent effects of the judgment have direct implications on national policies on public 
administrations (for a comprehensive overview: Bossaert et al. 2001). In sum, although the legislative 
procedures of the EU have not established a common policy on public administrations, the ECJ’s case law 
has produced functionally equivalent effects.
The absence of a genuine administrative acquis has hence not been a hindrance for the ECJ to establish 
a number of general administrative law principles. In contrast to these developments inside the EU, this 
lack in Community law was an obstacle vis-à-vis external states. In order to provide direction in the 
ongoing transformation processes and with regard to the necessity to define clear benchmarks required 
to measure whether a candidate state had met the accession criteria, the ‘blank concepts’ that worked 
precisely on context-sensitive diversity had to be filled with specific meaning. The notion of a European 
administrative space was therefore invented as placeholder and metaphor (Meyer-Sahling 2009: 10) for 
an actually non-existent single model and collective term of those implicit rules ensuring administrative 
coherence in the EU.
During the pre-accession phase the EU increasingly recognized that, in order to assure the new member 
states’ compliance with Community law, it was not only necessary to develop the sectoral administrative 
capacities but administrations in more general terms, that is horizontal administrative capacities. 
Accordingly, the criterion administrative capacity was introduced by the European Council of Madrid in 
1995 and was first referred to as a “criterion in its own right” in the Commission’s 1997 Avis that evaluated 
the candidates preparedness for accession (Verheijen 2000: 16). The subsequent annual Regular Reports 
filled the notion of ‘horizontal’ administrative capacities with meaning. Whereas “sectoral capacity was 
linked to particular parts of the acquis, horizontal capacity, emerged as synonymous with administrative 
reforms” (Dimitrova 2005: 80). Yet, in the absence of an acquis on horizontal administrative capacities, 
the Commission lacked standards to translate the criterion into measurable benchmarks. Instead of 
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developing binding EU standards on national administrative capacities, the EU relied on external sources. 
Cooperation with the Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (SIGMA) program, 
operating under the OECD Public Management Service (PUMA) and financed by EU funds under the pre-
accession program Phare, provided the tool for the assessment and support of administrative capacity in 
the candidate states. The main instrument was the so-called SIGMA baseline assessment that provided 
tangible criteria in “response to the lack of specificity in horizontal administrative capacity assessment, 
combined with the perceived lack of accuracy by candidate states of previous assessments” (Verheijen 
2000: 17). The SIGMA baseline criteria outlined minimum standards for horizontal administrative 
capacities for the first time. The weak links between the pre-accession standards and the general acquis 
showed also during the formulation of accession standards because internal cooperation within the 
Commission was remarkably weak. Thus, in Directorate General (DG) Enlargement “the Commission 
sought expertise not from within the organisation (we certainly did not consult our Directorate General 
for Administration!) or from other EU organisations, but from a non-EU source, OECD’s SIGMA” (official 
DG Enlargement, written exchange September 2007). Although founded on harmonized general principles, 
the imposition of tangibly operationalized standards on the candidate states drew on benchmarks that 
were developed in collaboration with other international organizations and “none of the above SIGMA 
defined ‘principles’ can be identified as common EU norms” (Dimitrova 2002: 182). Thus, although their 
content was defined for external application and had de facto binding effect on candidate states, the EAS 
remains of metaphorical status because it has not been converted into legally binding general horizontal 
standards that grant coercive supranational rule over its member states. 
In short, under the heading of a European administrative space, the Commission filled general 
administrative law principles with specific meaning. Standards were made tangible in terms of horizontal 
administrative capacities necessary to comply with the obligations of EU membership for states eager 
to enter the EU. Backed by accession conditionality, the EU had coercive means and with it power to 
foster change along these specific standards regarding national public administrations – even though 
these remained formally outside the EU’s own legal framework and therefore do not establish a genuine 
EU administrative acquis and policy. Within the EU, member states retain full formal authority over their 
public administrations and are bound only by a set of general abstract principles that leave considerable 
scope for interpretation. Beyond this, the ECJ case law has established some core principles. The shift from 
the principle of procedural autonomy to uniformity in legal interpretation and the opening up of national 
administrations’ recruitment systems have leveled the ground for shared responsibility and competences 
across the levels of governance when applying EU law.
3.2 Supranational Targets and National Brokers
Regarding administrative standards over which the EU has no authoritative power, it encourages voluntary 
national exchange and communication while preserving domestic specificities. Given the EU’s strong 
institutional structure to enforce standards, it is precisely the non-binding quality of un-coordinated 
voluntary standardization – in contrast to binding supranational harmonization – that makes it attractive 
for member states as it creates venues for cooperation without a formal transfer of competences. The 
unambiguous evasion of binding EU harmonization is reflected, on the one hand, in the composition, 
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functioning and legal status of the network-based body, the European Public Administrative Network 
(EUPAN). On the other hand, it shows in the initiatives that have resulted from this cooperation, the 
most prominent being the creation of a Common Assessment Framework (CAF), a self-assessment tool 
available to all kinds of administrative organizations on a voluntary basis. I will briefly discuss both EUPAN 
and CAF to illustrate in which way which administrative standards are diffused across the EU member 
states. Moreover, network-based or so-called ‘new’ modes of governance, as advocated prominently in 
the White Paper on Governance (Commission of the European Communities 2001a) and associated with 
the ‘Lisbon’ process as well as the ‘Better Regulation’ agenda (Council of the European Union 2006), have 
evolved as a goal in itself which the Commission tries to apply in its own processes and promote in the 
member states. In view of weak state capacities of the candidate states, “the EU has externalized this 
governance paradigm to its enlargement policy asking accession countries to bring society in to make the 
acquis work” (Börzel 2009; Sissenich 2007). Yet, precisely because of weak administrative and societal 
capacities this strategy has also proven to be of limited success.
EUPAN defines itself as an “informal network” and a “platform for exchange of views, experiences and 
good practices to improve the performance, competitiveness and quality of European central public 
administrations” whose “vision” is to support the implementation of the Lisbon strategy by “placing the 
citizen at the centre of public management, by working in different areas (human resources, innovation, 
quality, e-government) and with different actors in order to support efficiency and customer orientation in 
European public services”.6  EUPAN was founded in the second half of the 1970s. Since 1991, it convenes 
biannual meetings on the managerial level of national director generals who represent the member states’ 
ministers responsible for public administrations. On the technical level, EUPAN’s work is subdivided into 
three thematic working groups: (1) the HRWG – Human Resources Management Group was set up in 1987 
and is a platform to discuss basically all issues of personal policies of public service and chosen matters of 
reform programs, a sub-group of HRWG connects the NCP – National Contact Points that are to help the 
diffusion of CAF and its implementation; (2) the IPSG – Innovative Public Services Group discusses quality 
improvement of public services and signs responsible for the development of new tools and activities in this 
direction, accordingly, the CAF is subordinated to the IPSG; (3) the E-GOV – e-Government Working Group 
promotes the exchange of views, experiences and practices among member states, especially regarding 
the public administration aspects of e-government. To this end, it liaises with the EU Commission in various 
initiatives on the EU-level. Furthermore, the DISPA – Group of Directors of Schools and Institutes of Public 
Administrations works under the EUPAN umbrella, as well as the DBRR – Working Group of Directors 
and Experts for Better Regulations whose objective is (a) to facilitate the exchange of good practices and 
experiences through benchmarking projects with voluntary participation, and (b) to provide a forum for 
strategic discussion on the Union’s better regulation agenda to complement the work done in the various 
EU Ministerial Councils. To underline DBR’s informal character, its biannual meetings are not necessarily 
hosted and chaired by the Presidency in office. 
In order to enable cooperation without unintended pull-effects towards formalized harmonization, the 
member states keep emphasizing that all actors involved “acknowledge the informal nature of the 
6 See EUPAN website http://www.eupan.eu/3/70/ (last accessed 25 March 2009). Free for download on the 
same page is the EUPAN Handbook, initiated by the Finnish EU Presidency in 2006 and redrafted by the subse-
quent Portuguese Presidency in 2007, that provides more detailed information.
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European Public Administration Network (EUPAN)” (European Council 2008). Such formal affirmation 
of the informal legal status of EUPAN is relevant because in practice there is great overlap with the 
institutionalized bodies of the European Union. Most importantly, the respective EU Presidency Troikas 
(together with the Secretariat) are responsible for the development of the EUPAN agenda and the 
biannual meetings are convened by the EU presidency in office. Moreover, the European Commission is 
the 28th member of the “informal network” besides the national directors general. For the day-to-day 
work, however, not the Commission but the European Institute for Public Administration (EIPA) provides 
EUPAN with scientific, technical and financial support. EUPAN therefore actually maintains some critical 
independence from EU policy-making – the core of the informal character it underlines. There is little 
assessment of the actual effect the exchange in the open platform of EUPAN has for the performance 
of national public administrations. As EUPAN states itself, despite the multiple activities “until now, the 
public awareness of the network, as well as the practical impact of its work for the governments and 
public administrations of the Member States cannot be considered satisfactory.” Thus the network sees 
its future challenge in “making more effective use of the results produced [...] to better benefit of this 
comprehensive knowledge by strengthening the visibility of EUPAN as a network and by improving the 
dissemination of results” (EUPAN 2008: 4).
As mentioned before, the Common Assessment Framework (CAF) has been initiated within EUPAN. CAF 
is a self-evaluation tool available to organizations of all parts of the public administration on a voluntary 
basis. The assessment framework 
“is a Total Quality Management (TQM) tool inspired by the Excellence Model of the European 
Foundation Quality Management (EFQM) and the model of the German University of Administrative 
Sciences in Speyer. It is based on the premise that excellent results in organisational performance, 
citizens/customers, people and society are achieved through leadership driving strategy and 
planning, people, partnerships, and resources and processes. It looks at the organisation from 
different angles at the same time, the holistic approach of organisation performance analysis” 
(European Institute of Public Administration 2006: 2).7  
After a pilot phase in 2000, a revised version was launched with the support of the CAF Resource Centre 
based at EIPA, a second revision followed in 2006. About 900 customers within and beyond Europe 
participated in the period from 2000 to 2005. The actual diffusion and relevance of CAF may be judged 
as limited given that the approximately 1000 customers at date are made up of all kinds of organizations 
in customs/tax/finance, economy/agriculture, education/research, regional/local administration, and 
social services/security. Examples range from the Polish Tax Office to the Austrian Study Grant Authority, 
a Spanish Nursery School, Swedish Music and Art Schools, the Estonian Animal Recording Centre, or the 
Italian Municipality of Faenza and the British Birth and Children Office (Bundeskanzleramt Österreich 
2006). By virtue of national decisions, the use of CAF is obligatory for state administrations in the Czech 
Republic (central level), Slovakia (central level) and Romania. In the majority of the member states it is 
recommended by the national government, whereas in the remaining states Austria, Estonia, Finland, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK it is completely voluntary. The degree to which 
the use of CAF is binding for governments does however not correlate with the number of participating 
7 EFQM is also used as an alternative tool to CAF, same holds true to an even bigger extent for the ISO 9000.
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organizations in the respective states (Staes/Thijs 2005: 43f). Moreover, the self-evaluations do not 
mandate compulsory reforms or sanctions in case of bad performance, which further limits the potential 
for actual change of administrative organizations across the member states.
The instrument of targeting is applied more widely in policy areas in which member states aim for 
coordination without conferring policy competences under the traditional Community method (Citi/
Rhodes 2007). Open coordination involves a stronger involvement of the Commission than EUPAN or the 
CAF. Yet it works with the same mechanism of target-setting, whose actual realization puts considerable 
demands on all levels of public administration (Schout/Jordan 2008). Directly concerned with civil services 
is the Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA), which the EU promotes under the Better Regulation Initiative 
and is inspired by NPM ideas. In their analyses of the diffusion of RIA both Radaelli (2005) and Pollitt 
(2001) arrive at similar conclusions in terms of actual effects on national outcomes. 
“To sum up then, the language of RIA has produced a community of discourse for policy-makers and 
has stimulated the introduction of some instruments which are labelled ‘impact assessment’ but 
which in some cases exist only on paper and in other cases disguise different practice under the 
same label. Diffusion at the level of ‘talk’ has not yielded convergence in ‘actions’ and ‘results’ – to 
use the classic terms suggested by Brunsson (1989) and, more recently, Pollitt (2001).” (Radaelli 
2005: 930)
More fundamentally still, Idema and Kelemen (2006) raise theoretical doubts about the effectiveness open 
coordination and new modes of governance can produce because, even measured by its own standards, 
the procedures lack the resources and incentives for monitoring and the authority for shaming the member 
states. From this perspective, the absence of a shadow of hierarchy also explains why network-based 
governance involving civil society in the pre-accession strategy was even less effective under conditions 
of “double weakness” (Börzel 2009), or even triple weakness on the supranational, candidate state and 
societal levels. 
In sum, despite the arguably limited reach and impact, EU member states have developed informal 
communication networks and single initiatives to promote administrative standards in some chosen 
areas. The guiding objective that links these activities to the overall goals of the Union are the aims of 
the Lisbon Strategy that define improvement of services for citizens as a necessary stepping stone to 
achieve economic growth and welfare effects. The guiding method is aimed at creating communicative 
networks between governmental and other agencies involved in public administration matters. These 
networks draw only in part on institutional resources of the EU without promoting explicit harmonization 
objectives but emphasizing vigorously the informal and voluntary nature of cooperation between national 
public administrations. More generally, the instrument of targeting is promoted as being an alternative 
to the Community method, which builds on network governance and involves public and private actors. 
The questionable effectiveness of these instruments has been exacerbated in the enlargement context 
where, in the absence of a shadow of hierarchy, weak supranational instruments met week national 
administrative and societal capacities.
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3.3 Supranational Prescriptions for National Executing Bodies
Already the Treaty of Rome endowed the Commission with enforcement powers that establish direct 
administration through supranational bodies in the core areas of European integration, competition and 
internal trade (Bignami 2004: 4). Direct administration implies that not only policy goals but also the 
respective implementation modes and tools are defined on the supranational level. In essence, where the 
EU has exclusive powers it also implements them. Executive and national administrations are a limp in the 
Union’s implementation chain; in other areas, national administrations remain independent entities. Due 
to the limited resources of the Commission to implement ‘on the ground,’ direct administration entails 
that the Commission issues administrative circulars for sector specific implementation. These are explicit 
ordinances regarding administrative structures, institutions, practices and behavior is promoted across 
the states along the model defined uniformly by the supranational authority. Hence, 
“Community law is clearly making its way into national administrative systems. In some cases the 
impact is a direct one, having a direct effect on how public administrations function: the institution of 
new bodies; stipulation of the composition of such bodies; imposition of clearly defined procedures 
(for example for public procurement); redefinition of the very concept of public administration in 
order to apply certain Community provisions.” (Nizzo 2001: 7)
Despite an increase of direct influence due to the growing range of EU policies, direct influence through 
policy-making remains mostly limited to the Community’s core competences or new political responsibilities 
in which the formulation of policies on the EU level precedes the national level and therefore supranational 
models are directly transferred. 
Other than the direct impact through the harmonization of standards, discussed above with regard to 
the free movement of workers, the two core areas linked to Community policies are directives on public 
procurements and competition law that grant the Commission control on direct or indirect state subsidies 
to the private sector (Ziller 1998: 140). Areas that are sensitive to the protection of the Community’s 
financial interests as well as some newer EU policies have also incrementally been added and extend the 
list of sectoral policies for which the “Commission defines the characteristics that certain administrative 
bodies should possess” (Fournier 1998a: 113).8 Although direct administration plays a role in the 
administration of some newer Community policies (e.g. environment) and horizontal principles (e.g. anti-
discrimination), due to the dominance of economic integration 
8 The list includes “the bodies responsible for ensuring the free circulation of goods (regulations, standardisation 
and certification) and services (in particular, banking, insurance and security transactions); the bodies respon-
sible for monitoring competition; regulatory bodies for telecommunications; the departments dealing with 
indirect taxes; the bodies responsible for veterinary and plant health inspection and those that implement the 
CAP; the transport authorities; the departments responsible for health and safety at work and social affairs; 
the bodies responsible for the environment; consumer protection bodies; the administrations responsible for 
home affairs and justice, to the extent that they are in charge of the enforcement of immigration laws, border 
control and international police and judicial co-operation; customs; financial control, in particular to ensure the 
fight against fraud and the monitoring of the use of Community funds. In this regard, the Commission stresses 
the need to make a clear distinction between internal and external control and to strengthen the means for 
fighting transnational financial crime.” (Fournier 1998a: 114)
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“an asymmetry between the regulation of market-related administrative proceedings and other types 
of administrative proceedings has developed. Significant differences have emerged, depending on 
the area of law applicable, differences which demand common general principles, able to serve a 
unifying function and ensure systematic coherence and uniformity” (Franchini 2004: 196).
This asymmetry is best reflected by the notion of Services of General (Economic) Interest (SGEI/SGI) which 
was already enshrined in the Treaty of Rome. A reference to SGEI/SGI was introduced in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (Article 16, EC) highlighting the fundamental character of the values underpinning such 
services (see also Commission of the European Communities 2001b). As a term for public services that 
cannot be equally well-provided by private services “the very concept of services of general interest was 
developed by the European Community” (Mangenot 2005: 4). Obviously, the authority to define what 
falls under national authority of SGEI or rather the Community’s competition laws is crucial for the actual 
responsibilities of national public administrations in areas such as water management, telecommunications 
or energy supply (services of general economic interest), but also security or education (services of general 
interest). For the Commission, SGI generally also includes social services (Commission of the European 
Communities 2006). In essence, the delimitation of national SGEI/SGI by the Commission or the ECJ does 
not only impact the structure and practices of national administrations but their very functions to the 
extent that it implies the prohibition of public monopolies in certain areas. The Commission recognizes 
that the mission to fulfill a general interest takes precedent over the competition rules of the EC Treaties 
and that, in particular, many social and health services imply obligations that differ substantially from those 
offered on a commercial basis (Commission of the European Communities 2004). This notwithstanding, 
short of a precise definition of the distinguishing line between SGEI/SGI and the EC founding principles of 
anti-trust and competition, there is considerable scope to demark the actual functions of national public 
administrations.
This leads us to the field of common administration, in which the Commission and national administrations 
share competences and functions, in some cases also involving specialized agencies. Three different modes 
of shared administration can be identified that differ regarding the locus of authority and implementation 
responsibilities: (1) joined administration (single supranational policy objective/hybrid implementation 
across levels), (2) decentralized administration (parallel, non-exclusive legal powers between levels/
implementation by an agency), and (3) regulatory concert (single organization composed of supranational 
and national authorities) (Cassese 2004: 22). It applies to each of these joint ventures that they directly 
shape national administrations that participate because implementation is restricted to a specified single 
model. Accordingly, common administration consciously promotes convergence which is necessary for 
mixed implementation between the Commission and 27 member states (1), or which follows by definition 
when delegating implementation to a single agency for all member states (2 and 3). In turn, also national 
“‘agencificaiton’ opens up for new partnerships and autonomous contracts between executive bodies 
and the EU level (particularly the Commission) and semi-detached (from ministerial departments) 
regulatory authorities at the national level. Thus national agencies become, as regards their policy 
formulation and implementation activities, to some extent parts of two administrations; on the one 
hand their respective national governments, on the other hand an emerging ‘Union administration’” 
(Egeberg 2007: 2). 
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Notably, common administration rather than direct administration is the most relevant field in which the 
Union is likely to further extend its direct influence on national public administrations. It may therefore be 
seen as the core element of a network-based European administrative space. As Curtin and Egeberg (2008: 
655) argue, these developments “have placed the development of the European executive on a radically 
different trajectory”. On the one hand, because the Commission has developed into an executive centre 
and, on the other, because national governments are increasingly fragmented and lead to an increase of 
national agencies that establish direct networks with the supranational level.
Administrative capacity building in the enlargement context was first and foremost concerned with 
ensuring that the incoming member states would comply with the acquis, which the principles developed 
in SIGMA were to complement (Meyer-Sahling/Goetz 2009: 6). Therefore, 
“[t]he main requirements associated with the ‘bureaucracy criterion’ emerged as sectoral capacity 
to implement sectoral acquis; the development of European integration co-ordination structures; 
horizontal reform of the administrations including civil service laws and a strategy for comprehensive 
public administration reform; and, finally, ‘ability to implement’” (Dimitrova 2002: 179). 
In other words, they focused on the candidate states’ ability to achieve policy goals. In areas in which member 
state administrations act as direct executing bodies guided by the Commission, leverage over candidate 
states was strongest, one core area of administrative capacity building was accordingly environmental 
policy where the Commission imposed specific implementation structures and styles (Beckmannand/
Dissing 2004: 142f; Schmidt/Knopp 2004). To prepare the candidate states for participation in the Common 
Agricultural and Structural policy, SAPARD and ISPA served as specialized assistance programs. Notably, 
administrative capacities to administer funds were made a condition for the disbursement of funds. In 
consequence, implementation of the pre-accession rural development scheme SAPARD was considerably 
delayed for most states by about two years.
In a nutshell, with the extension of the Union’s competences, the areas in which it can hierarchically define 
particular implementation modes and instruments, and thus advance a single administrative procedure in 
the management of sectoral issues, have also increased. Direct administration remains concentrated on 
the EU core competences in which supranational influence stretches even into the delimitation of public 
functions. Similar effects of single models for sector specific implementation procedures occur in policy 
areas in which formulation on the EU level precedes the establishment of policies on the national level. In 
the enlargement context, leverage on administrative capacity building was also highest in these fields and 
supported by sectoral assistance instruments. The most relevant realm in which mandatory adherence to 
concrete EU models has advanced since the turn of the millennium has been common administration. It 
divides administrative authority among the levels in a single implementation procedure and thus creates 
shared rights and responsibilities. These shared rights and responsibilities create functional needs to 
establish a coherent procedural model, which in turn ensures accountability and liability of administrative 
acts within the intertwined system of EU governance.
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3.4 National Responses of Independent Implementing Agencies
The indirect supranational influence on national administrations based on the obligation to implement EC 
policy goals is not bound to prescriptions on national administrative means. Adaptation is hence variable 
and depends on a broad range of possible causes. This mechanism, in contrast to direct, networked, 
compound or common administration, has for a long time been the most relevant one because it 
represented initially the only mode in which European integration impacted member state administrations 
(Trondal/Egeberg 2007: 293). It is thus also not surprising that the bulk of political scientific work that 
focuses on Europeanization processes has predominantly focused on this mechanism. Any prediction of 
the supranational impact on national administrations is most difficult under this mechanism because no 
direction in terms of standards or instruments is uniformly defined for all states. Consequently, adaptations 
depend on the features of the national administration in place and the policy-characteristics at stake. In 
the words of Knill: 
“[t]he level of administrative adaptation cannot be directly deduced from the respective policy (where 
one regulation facilitates the national adaptation more than another) nor do systematic differences 
exist in the countries regarding their capability to adapt. In other words, domestic change and 
persistence follow no simple ‘country-based’ or ‘policy-based’ logic. As a consequence, we not only 
observe administrative convergence, but also (and to a similar extend) divergence – or persistence 
of administrative differences across member states” (2001: 5). 
Whether and how the need to comply with EU policy objectives by choosing adequate national means 
has been studied with regard to different administrative and policy types. I will therefore merely refer 
to this rich body of research which offers far more sophistication than can be provided in this paper. 
The following outline remains limited to some basic points in relation to the definition of a European 
administrative space. 
Domestic impacts of EU-level institutions (Olsen 2002), short of concrete procedural prescriptions, 
correspond with the logic of policy implementation by indirect administration. This has been the 
dominant mode of policy implementation for the first decades of EU integration. It is based on two general 
principles. 
“The first principle is the autonomy of national administrative systems, and thus ‘structural 
subsidiarity’. Day to day management of Community law – its concrete application – is conveniently 
entrusted to the appropriate national administrative laws and relevant authorities, which become 
the outer branches of the Community’s administration.” (Nizzo 2001: 5) 
This first principle is complemented by the second that requires results, 
“i.e. efficient, effective and uniform enforcement of Community provisions. Domestic administrations, 
by virtue of a duty of loyal co-operation under the Treaty (article 10), are required to take all 
necessary steps to ensure full implementation of these provisions. Effective implementation of EC 
Law (the principle of effectiveness) is an obligation imposed to Member States by the Treaties and 
its fulfilment is verified by the European Court of Justice on a case-by-case basis.” (Nizzo 2001: 5f)
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These principles stand in contrast to direct Community administration. Indirect administration is still the 
dominant mode of integration as far as national administrative change is concerned. Accordingly, 
“in the first thirty years after the Treaty of Rome, the common wisdom was that European 
administrative law did not exist. [...] Implementation of directives, regulations, and other forms 
of Community legislation was the responsibility of national administrations subject to their unique 
traditions of constitutional and administrative law, in what is know as ‘indirect administration’” 
(Bignami 2004: 3f; see also Chiti 2004). 
Indirect administration does not presuppose change of national administrations per se. On the contrary, 
it seeks to accommodate domestic differences. The way policy implementation is coordinated in the 
complex comitology procedures is a practical reflection of the autonomy / effectiveness principles. 
“Taking a closer look, then, at the enforcement of Community law, there is no convergence on the 
means of application [...]; what counts is to ensure that application meets certain standards of 
effectiveness. That this is both a radial approach and an effective one hardly needs emphasis.” 
(Nizzo 2001: 6)
It should hence be of little surprise that empirical analyses show some shifts in the resource and personnel 
allocation as well as decision-making cycles due to Europeanization, while overall national administrations 
prove rather stable. 
“[A] main finding (although with many nuances) is that there has been no revolutionary change in 
any of the national systems and no significant convergence towards a common institutional model, 
homogenizing the domestic structures of the European states.” (Olsen 2001)
Supranational consent to a multitude of national models instead of developing a single unified model has 
actually proven to be 
“compatible with the maintenance of distinct national institutional arrangements and there is even 
reconfirmation and restoration of established national structures and practices. In sum, structural 
diversity persists among the core domestic structures of governance in spite of increasing contact 
and competition between national models. Established national patterns are resistant but also 
flexible enough to cope with changes at the European level” (Olsen 2001).
Unlike the direct leeway the Commission had on candidate states trough SAPARD and ISPA, the bulk of 
sectoral administrative capacity building had to somehow evolve within the national administrations as it 
had incrementally evolved in the older member states and in absence of anything resembling a uniform 
model. The Twinning instrument was developed as the main tool to respond to this challenge. Also due 
to the absence of a genuine EU model, the strengthening of administrative capacities was assisted by 
secondment of national administrators from EU member states to the candidate states in order to promote 
direct learning and socialization processes (Tomolová/Tulmets 2007). A difficulty in this was, obviously, 
that the seconded officials (usually from two different member states) often did not share the same model 
and thus did not always hold the same opinion. Therefore, also for the use of twinning that was to assist 
in developing adequate national responses, the 
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“absence of a clear ‘EU preference’, coupled with the fragmented and diverse manner in which 
the EU has chosen to ‘police’ administrative reform in central and eastern Europe, reinforces 
the significance of domestic factors mediating the Europeanization of the accession applicants” 
(Papadimitriou/Phinnemore 2004: 536). 
In essence, the effect of EU integration on national administrations as a result of policy-induced national 
adaptations depends primarily on the type of administration and specific policy that is intended to be met. 
Therefore, differences between member states persist and one cannot deduce generalizable expectations 
for cross-state approximation. Still, the high commitment and strong mutual dependency concerning 
shared policy goals create strong interdependencies between national administrations. This may lead to 
competition or socialization effects between national administrations and therefore change within the 
individual states. Changed opportunity structures may adapt preferences of actors; and socialization 
may adapt norms of actors and therefore even lead to fundamental changes inside each state’s public 
administration in absence of a unified single EU model of public administration. Institutional mismatch 
to implement certain policies may trigger far-reaching change of public administrations that form part of 
the EU’s multi-level governance. Enlargement mirrored these processes within the twinning instrument 
that promoted the exchange between national state officials to trigger learning and socialization, which in 
absence of a single model, however, did reinforce domestic factors.
4 Conclusion: Mechanisms of an Emerging European Administrative Space
This paper set out asking: why do more and more observers claim the existence of an emerging European 
administrative space while empirical evidence is rich in illustrating that convergence across the EU 
member states’ public administrations is not increasing? The question that ensues is whether European 
administrative space should exist at all given that “there are no European policy programmes with an 
exclusive focus on national administrations. Nothing equivalent to national administrative policy can be 
found on the supranational level” (Knill 2001: 36). This paper has shown that despite the absence of a proper 
EU administrative policy, multiple mechanisms through which the EU can trigger change are at work. Given 
the empirical complexity of the subject matter, I argued that the most pragmatic way forward is indeed 
to identify ideal type modes of interaction between supranational and national units and the respective 
mechanisms at work. Building on this typology, the actual ways in which the EU interacts with public 
administrations of the member and candidate states were offered by empirical illustration. In conclusion, 
it shows that the EU has indeed developed multiple instruments that, depending on the policy field or 
administrative standard at stake, put the supranational and national administrative units in a variety of 
different actor relationships that range from hierarchical submission to independence in implementing EU 
policy goals. The most relevant area that seems to be emerging is that of shared responsibilities in which 
authority is not allocated to one or the other level of governance but administrative responsibility is shared. 
Integrating the EU’s impact on national public administrations, both as an end in itself through standards 
or merely as a means to achieve common policy goals, the framework offers a more comprehensive 
conceptual angle than most Europeanization approaches, which focus mainly on the latter.
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Even if the article only touched upon outcomes, the discussion of the mechanisms at work and 
instruments applied showed that the processes should not be expected to produce overall convergence. 
Only prescriptions for the sectoral implementation of policies suggest a creation of equivalent processes 
and structures across the member states, yet, the areas in which the Community has such administrative 
powers are limited. Therefore, theoretically we should actually rather expect a process of increasing 
differentiated coherence than either increasing convergence or divergence between member states.
The only instant in which underlying principles of differentiated coherence did not fit supranational policy 
goals was Eastern enlargement. Faced with public administrations in the candidate states, apparently 
incapable of ensuring their internal coherence and therefore compliance with supranational policies, the 
EU declared administrative capacities an end in themselves. In consequence, a European model for a 
standard public administration had to be provided in order to set benchmarks and a fair process which 
each candidate had to go through in order to comply with the accession criteria of horizontal administrative 
capacities. To create something equivalent to national administrative policy was, however, never a subject 
of debate, and therefore, so the main conclusion of this article, neither a feasible nor a desirable option. 
The Commission escaped the dilemma by developing tangible standards outside the EU and applied these 
exclusively to the candidate states. It is here that the all-embracing notion of a European administrative 
space was first used to give a name to a diffuse but needed concept. “The EAS is a metaphor with practical 
implications for the Member States and embodying, inter alia, administrative law principles as a set of 
criteria to be applied by candidate countries in their efforts to attain the administrative capacity for EU 
Membership” (Cardona 1999: 6). Outside the particular enlargement context, a European administrative 
space emerges from diffusion processes that cause change in domestic public administration without an 
imperative for assimilation across states. 
Obviously, if one agrees that the questions of administrative dynamics are too important to be ignored, 
the ultimate purpose of this analytical framework spans much wider than this paper to the actual effects 
that result in and across member states. The theoretical grid and pragmatic approach to scrutinize the 
diffusion of supranational ideas by tackling these processes from the mechanisms which they invoke are a 
first step towards answering the vital larger question. 
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